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additional compensation to the employee, and that the employee realized
income in each of the years the option was exercised by the wife.
SUMMARY
Recapitalizations, undertaken for legitimate business purposes, and
"preferred stock bail-outs," followed by a gift or other disposition of the
thinned-down equity, will facilitate a shifting of control of the family
business without necessarily incurring adverse tax consequences. In par-
ticular, the utilization of section 306 stock for estate planning purposes
should not be overlooked, for only too frequently this stock is condemned
when in fact it can afford very desirable flexibility without any "practical"
tax disadvantages. A third method of shifting control involves the issu-
ance of additional stock to key employees through the possibility of the
"restricted stock option" procedure. However, if the requirements for a
"restricted stock option" are not met, this course may be a dangerous one.
VI
PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMATION OF A MUTUAL FUND
AFTER DISPOSITION OF THE BUSINESS DURING
THE OWNER'S LIFETIME
Sterling Newell, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The owner of a family business may at some point during his lifetime
decide to dispose of the family business before his death. Having reached
this conclusion, he must then determine the form in which the transac-
tion is to be cast. If a larger corporation is interested in acquiring the
family business, it may be able to negotiate an exchange of the owner's
stock in the family business or of the assets of the family business for stock
of the acquiring corporation. If this exchange qualifies for the special tax
treatment afforded by the reorganization provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, the exchange may be accomplished in large measure tax free.1
* The author acknowledges the assistance rendered by his associate, Richard T. Watson, in
the preparation of this article.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (A), merger or consolidation; § 368(a) (1) (B),
stock for stock; § 368(a) (1) (C), stock for assets [hereinafter cited as CODE ]. The tax-
free exchange is treated in CODE §§ 351-68. See generally, Baker, Continuity of Interest
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Alternatively, the owner of the family business might decide to ar-
range for a redemption of his stock in the family corporation as a means
of conveying his interest to the other shareholders? Or he might sell
his stock to the other shareholders, to members of his family, to em-
ployees of the family business, or perhaps to complete outsiders. Such
transactions normally involve the imposition of a tax on the gain realized
although the recognition of the gain may be deferred and spread over a
number of years by use, for example, of a private annuity.'
The reorganization and redemption sections of the Internal Revenue
Code and private annuities have been the subject of extensive analysis.
This article will examine a relatively new technique, the possibility of tax
free diversification after a disposition of the family business which quali-
fied as a reorganization.4
The Objective: Diversification Without Taxation
If the owner of the family business disposed of the business in a trans-
action which qualified for the special tax treatment afforded by the re-
organization provisions of the Code he may, at the conclusion of the
transaction, hold a substantial block of stock in the acquiring corporation
at a relatively low basis.5 Subsequent sale of this stock in order to
achieve diversification would lead to a heavy capital gains tax, but reten-
tion of the stock of the acquiring corporation might be undesirable from
an investment point of view. At this point the former owner's objective,
briefly stated, is tax free diversification. One possible means of achieving
this result is through participation in the organization of a "mutual fund."
PARTCIPATION IN THE FORMATION OF A MUTUAL FUND
The theory of the transaction involved is rather simple. A number
of individuals who hold substantial blocks of different highly appred-
Requirement in Reorganizations Re-examined - the Hickok Case, N.Y.U. 18TH INsT. ON
FED. TAx 761 (1960); BrrTKEE, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION OF Cou'ORATIoNS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 357 (1959); Calkins, et al., Tax Problems of Close Corporations: A Survey,
10 WEST. RES. L REV. 144 (1959); Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in Cor-
porate Acquisitions, 70 HARV. L REv. 1183 (1957); Merritt, Tax Free Corporate Acquisitions
- The Law and the Proposed Regulations, 53 Mc. L REv. 911 (1955).
2. CODE § 302. See generally Bir=ER, FEDERAL INcozm TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 223 (1959); Brown, Selected Problems in Stock Redemptions, U. So.
CALIF. 1959 TAX INST. 171; Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax,
74 HARV. L. REV. 866 (1961); Kohn, Capital Gain Problems in Particular Areas - Dis-
positions of Corporate Stock, 12 WEST. REs. L. REv. 310 (1961).
3. See generally Ekman, Private Annuities, 22 OHIO ST. LJ. 279 (1961); Farmer, Divesting
Growth Potentials in Estate Planning, U. So. CALIF. 1961 TAX INST. 437; McGiveron &
Lynch, Private Annuity Laws Are Practical Now as Tax Treatment Grows More Certain,
10 J. TAxATION 322 (1959).
4. Treatment of a transaction as a reorganization is not always to the taxpayer's advantage.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 3113 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1961); Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961 INT. REV. BULL. No. 34, at 10.
5. CODE § 358.
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ated securities, by means of an escrow created for the purpose, simul-
taneously transfer these securities to a mutual fund organized for the
purpose of receiving them. In exchange, the individuals receive shares
of the mutual fund. The number of shares of the mutual fund received
by each individual is usually based on the market value as of the date of
exchange of the securities he transfers to the fund.
Advantages
It would appear that such a transaction falls squarely within the
provisions of section 351, which provides:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corpora-
tion by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities
in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control . . . of the corporation.
If section 351 applies, no gain will be recognized by the individuals
involved on the exchange of their appreciated securities for shares of the
mutual fund. They will thus have achieved diversification accompanied
by professional management without incurring a capital gains tax.
Each individual's basis for his shares of the mutual fund will be the
same as his basis for the securities he exchanged with the fund.' The
fund's basis for the securities transferred to it will be the same as the
basis of the securities in the hands of their transferor.' Thus, if owner ex-
changes 1,000 shares in the acquiring corporation with a basis of $1.00
per share and a current market value of $100.00 per share for 1,000
shares of the fund, owner's basis for his new shares of the fund will be
$1.00 per share and the fund's basis for its shares in the acquiring corpora-
tion will be $1.00 per share.
Disadvantages: Investment Considerations
As most of the securities transferred to such a fund will have been
highly appreciated in the hands of the individual shareholders of the
fund, the current market value of the securities comprising the fund's
initial portfolio will in most cases greatly exceed the fund's cost basis for
these securities. This means that the sale by the fund of almost any
security in its initial portfolio will lead to the realization of substantial
capital gains. This fact in and of itself may lead to the retention in the
fund of securities the disposal of which would be indicated by normal in-
vestment considerations. Moreover, the composition of the fund itself
may, to a degree, reflect the securities available for transfer to such a fund
rather than the balance an investment fund manager might normally
6. CODE 358.
7. CoDE § 362.
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seek. However, both these considerations may be outweighed by the
desirability of obtaining at least some diversification.
Disadvantages: Tax Consequences of "Pooling" of Unrealized
Capital Gains
As has previously been indicated, the number of shares of the mutual
fund received by the individuals who participate in its organization is
determined on the basis of the market value of the securities transferred
by the individuals to the fund. No adjustment is made for the varying
degrees of unrealized appreciation inherent in these securities despite the
fact that this appreciation represents a potential capital gains tax lia-
bility for the fund's shareholders. When the fund realizes capital gains
upon the sale of these appreciated securities, the resultant capital gains
tax is apportioned among the shareholders of the fund according to the
number of shares of the fund they own. This apportionment ignores
the extent to which prior appreciation of the fund's securities in the
hands of its shareholders contributes to the capital gain realized by the
fund.8 The shareholders are thus in effect pooling their capital gains.
As a result, a shareholder of the fund who exchanged securities with
a relatively low appreciation ratio will in effect pay more than his fair
share of the capital gains incurred by the fund. Theoretically, this dis-
parity will be compensated for when the shareholder disposes of his shares
in the fund because the tax paid by the shareholder on capital gains real-
ized by the fund in effect reduces the tax payable by the shareholder
when he disposes of his shares.
Most mutual funds elect to be taxed as regulated investment com-
panies under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code. A regulated
investment company may handle realized capital gains in one of two
ways: First, it may retain the realized capital gain and pay the tax there-
on, thereby reducing the net asset value of the fund by one-quarter of the
realized capital gain. If this is done, the shareholders of the fund in-
crease their cost bases in their shares by three-quarters of the capital gain
realized. Second, it may distribute realized capital gains, thereby reduc-
ing the net asset value of the fund by the entire amount of the capital
gain realized. In this event, the shareholders pay the tax and make no
adjustment in the bases of their shares in the fund.9
Thus, whether the fund retains realized capital gains or whether it
distributes them, the effect of the realization of capital gains by the fund
8. In contrast, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires that an existent mutual
fund which exchanges shares of the fund for the assets of a personal holding company dis-
count the value of the assets of the personal holding company for the purpose of the exchange
if the assets of the personal holding company are more highly appreciated than those of the
fund. See the discussion in Shop Talk, 14 J. TAXArsoN 190 (1961).
9. CODE § 852.
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is to narrow the gap between the net asset value per share of the fund and
the per share basis of the individual shareholders of the fund by the
amount of the shareholder's allocable portion of the gain realized. This
reduces the shareholder's unrealized appreciation in his shares of the fund.
As a result, while such a shareholder pays more than his share of the
capital gains tax resulting from sale of the appreciated securities in the
fund's portfolio, the effect of his doing so is to reduce the amount of
capital gains tax the shareholder will have to pay on the sale of his shares
of the fund.
However, continued realization of capital gains by the fund will in
time lead to a situation where some shareholders will have a cost basis for
their shares of the fund equal to the fund's net asset value per share.
Thereafter, realization of capital gains by the fund will have the effect of
decreasing the net asset value of the fund's shares to less than the share-
holder's basis (or increasing his basis to more than the net asset value
per share). As a result, such a shareholder will realize less net after tax
proceeds upon selling his shares of the fund than he would have realized
had he sold his own shares of appreciated securities rather than trans-
ferring them to the fund. If such a shareholder can utilize the capital
loss deduction resulting from the sale of his shares in the fund at less than
their basis, his loss will be compensated for by the resultant tax savings.
Otherwise, at all times after the shareholder's basis for his shares in the
fund reaches the fund's net asset value per share each $1.00 of capital
gains realized by the fund and attributable to such a shareholder will re-
sult in a twenty-five cent loss to the shareholder, assuming him to be in
the fifty per cent bracket."0
It should be emphasized that this problem will become acute immedi-
ately upon the death of a shareholder in the fund. At this point the
shareholder's legatees will receive a stepped-up basis for the fund shares
and be placed in the position of having a basis equal to the net asset value
of the shares." Thereafter, realization of capital gain by the fund will
have the effect described above. This suggests the wisdom of tendering
the shares of such a fund to the fund for redemption as soon as practi-
cable after the death of a shareholder. Instructions to this effect might
well be included in the will of a shareholder in such a fund.
Moreover, if the above analysis is correct, there may be a snowballing
effect attendant to the redemption of shares in the fund. As there is no
incentive for individuals to purchase fund shares for cash,'2 the primary
10. See Appendix I, infra.
11. CoDE § 1014(a).
12. A purchaser for cash of shares in such a fund would immediately have a cost basis equal
to the net asset value per share of the fund (ignoring purchase expense) with the possible
disadvantages discussed above. These disadvantages differ, however, only in degree from
those attendant to the purchase of shares in any mutual fund that holds appreciated securities.
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assets available to the fund for the purpose of redeeming its shares will
be the appreciated securities held by the fund.'" Thus, if shareholders re-
quest redemption of their shares, it may be necessary for the fund to sell
appreciated securities; additional capital gains will thereby be realized,
leading perhaps to additional requests for redemption, leading to addition-
al capital gains and so forth. This danger has been noted and provision
made for redemptions in kind by some of the funds.
IRS Attitude
Finally, there is the matter of the Internal Revenue Service's attitude.
Prior to February 15, 1961, a limited number of Revenue Rulings were
obtained to the effect that participation in the organization of a mutual
fund pursuant to section 351 in the manner above described did not in-
volve the recognition of gain. 4 However, the Service has announced that
it will not issue rulings in connection with requests filed subsequent to
February 16, 1961."5 It has been suggested that the Service's refusal to
issue rulings may be overcome by the use of a dosing agreement. 6 This
appears unlikely" and, accordingly, any participation in such fund must
be based on one's judgment as to the Service's attitude and the possible
results of litigation.
There has been some dispute as to the implications of the Service's
refusal to continue to issue rulings. The Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue recently made the following observations:
The Service had issued some rulings holding Section 351 applicable
in the organization of particular investment funds. On further analysis,
however, it was concluded that this type of transaction could more
properly be regarded as a method for unduly circumventing the capital
gains tax. It was then decided, in the interests of wise administra-
tion of the tax laws, to issue no further rulings.
At the date of the announcement of this decision, several other funds
had applications pending and, in view of two considerations, we re-
luctantly agreed that rulings would be given in these cases. First, there
were very serious competitive advantages and disadvantages involved -
certain funds with rulings were in a position to attract customers of other
13. To the extent that shareholders of the fund elect to receive distribution of income and/or
capital gains in shares of the fund rather than in cash, such retained cash would be available
for the redemption of shares. Electing to receive shares of the fund rather than cash is, of
course, in effect the same as buying shares for cash and presents the possible disadvantageous
consequences discussed above.
14. See address by Mortimer M. Caplin, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, before the Tax
Executives Institute at San Francisco, California, on August 14, 1961, reported in P-H 1961
Fed. Tax 5 54904.
15. Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 CuM. BULL 880, as amended, T.I.R. 311, 7 CCH 1961 STAND.
Fun. TAX Rim. 9 6311 (March 3, 1961).
16. P-H 1961 FED. TAxEs 9 32130 (March 9, 1961).
17. Treas. Reg. § 601.202(d) (1960).
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funds without rulings. Second, was the fact that the administrative
conclusion here was to discontinue the issuance of rulings rather than
to rule adversely.
Had it been decided to rule adversely on these transactions in the
future, no favorable rulings would have been issued on the pending
applications.'8 (Emphasis added.)
While the Commissioner's future course of action remains somewhat
in doubt and the success which he would enjoy in the event of a determi-
nation to attack these transactions is uncertain, it may at least be said that
the Commissioner's attitude toward tax free diversification is less than
benign. Absent special considerations, it would appear that only the
former owner of a family business who is advanced in age, who holds
highly appreciated securities, and who has provided his executor with ex-
plicit instructions and authority to sell should consider participation in
the organization of such a fund. This conclusion is supported both by
the present uncertainties surrounding the formation of the fund itself and
by the unfortunate consequences which may flow from the pooling of
capital gains.
APPENDIX
I. The following illustrates the effect of "pooling" capital gains:
(a) A holds 1,000 shares B holds 1,000 shares Y Cor-
X Corporation with: Basis poration with: Basis (per
(per share) $100 share) -0-
Current market value (per Current market value (per
share) $100 share) $100
Net after tax value to B if
Net after tax value to A if shares are sold (proceeds
shares are sold $100,000 of sale less tax) $75,000
(b) A and B organize a mutual fund by exchanging their shares of X and Y
for 1,000 shares each of the fund:
Current market value of assets of fund $200,000
Net asset value per share of fund $100
Fund's basis for 1,000 shares of X per share $100
Fund's basis for 1,000 shares of Y per share -0-
A's basis for his 1,000 shares of fund per share $100
B's basis for his 1,000 shares of fund per share -0-
18. Address by Caplin, op. cit. supra note 14.
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(c) Fund sells the 1,000 shares of Y:
Cash proceeds
Basis
Capital gain
Capital gain per share of mutual fund
fl. If fund distributes $50,000 capital gain to each shareholder:
(a) Fund's assets will be:
1,000 shares of X at $100
Net asset value per share of fund
(b) Value of A's holding
would then be:
1,000 shares of Fund at $50 $50,000
Cash (capital gain distribu-
tion less tax) $37,500
Value of holding $87,500
(c) A's original net value
(from I (a)) $100,000
Value of A's holding $87,500
A's potential loss $12,500
(d) A's total basis for his
1,000 shares of the fund $100,000
Value of 1,000 shares of
the fund $50,000
A's potential loss on sale $50,000
A's tax saving therefrom (if
capital loss may be
utilized) $12,500
III. If fund retains the capital gains and pays the
(a) Fund's assets will be:
1,000 shares of X at $100
Cash (proceeds of sale of shares of Y less tax)
Total assets
Net asset value per share
(b) Value of A's holding will be: Value
1,000 shares of fund 1,000 s
at $87.50 $87,500 at S
(c) A's original net value
(from I (a))
Value of A's holding
A's potential loss
$100,000
$87,500
$12,500
Value
B's orij
(froi
$100,000
-0-
$100,000
$50
$100,000
$50
Value of B's holding
would then be:
1,000 shares of Fund at $50 $50,000
Cash (capital gain distribu-
tion less tax) $37,500
Value of holding $87,500
Value of B's holding $87,500
B's original net value
(from I (a)) $75,000
B's potential profit $12,500
Value of 1,000 shares of
the fund $50,000
B's basis for his 1,000 shares
of the fund -0-
B's potential gain on
the sale $50,000
B's potential capital
gains tax $12,500
tax thereon:
$100,000
$75,000
$175,000
$ 87.50
of B's holding will be:
hares of fund
37.50
of B's holding
ginal net value
n I (a))
B's potential profit
$87,500
87,500
75,000
12,500
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